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Consequences and Causes of Corruption — What do We 









Data on the perceived levels of corruption from a cross-section of countries has 
been introduced fruitfully into recent empirical research. This chapter reviews 
studies on the consequences and causes of corruption. It includes research on 
the impact of corruption on investment, GDP, institutional quality, government 
expenditure, poverty, international flows of capital, goods and aid. Causes of 
corruption  focus  on  absence  of  competition,  policy  distortions,  political 
systems, public salaries as well as an examination of colonialism, gender and 
other cultural dimensions. 
 
JEL-Classification: H3, K42, O57 
 
I. Using Survey Data on Corruption 
There is  currently  a wave of empirical investigations on the causes and consequences of 
corruption.  These  investigations  by  and  large  relate  to  cross–country  analyses,  based  on 
comparative assessments of the extent of corruption in various countries. Such assessments 
are sometimes compiled by agencies to determine country risks and the data gathered are sold 
to investors. Other sources are surveys of the general public or elite businesspeople. The data 
on corruption are thus based on subjective perceptions and expertise, but considered to be 
good  indicators  of  real  levels  of  corruption.  They  allow  to  bring  empirical  research  on 
corruption beyond the anecdotal descriptions that previously dominated. 
 
Instead  of  using  perceptions  data,  Goel  and  Nelson  [1998]  and  Fisman  and  Gatti  [2002] 
employ objective data: the number of public officials convicted for abuse of public office in 
various states of the USA. They assume that high conviction rates are an indicator of actual 
high levels of corruption. Goel and Nelson [1998] relate this variable to the real per capita 
total expenditures of the local government, arguing that state intervention and public spending 
give rise to rent-seeking activities and hence corruption. The authors report a significant, 
positive association between these variables. However, the correlation might be explained 
differently.  As  governments  increase  their  spending,  the  judiciary  branch  may  also  be 
allocated more funding, resulting in higher conviction rates. In this case, conviction rates are 
not  an  adequate  indicator  for  the  actual  incidence  of  corruption.  Rather,  they  reflect  the 
quality of the judiciary. The appropriateness of such data as a proxy for corruption has thus 
been widely disputed. Due to this, most researchers have used subjective indicators.  
 
                                                 
1 Johann Graf Lamsbdorff holds a chair position in economic theory at the University of 
Passau. He can be reached at jlambsd uni-passau.de. He is grateful to M. Nell, P. Manow 
and S.U. Teksoz for helpful comments.  The corruption index applied in the subsequent studies was very often that by Transparency 
International (TI). This is a composite index based on a variety of different assessments made 
with the help of elite business surveys or expert panels. Some studies used data from these 
individual assessments, i.e. the Institute for Management Development (IMD) or the World 
Economic Forum (WEF). For a description of these sources see Lambsdorff [2004]. Older 
sources that are sometimes used in research are the World Bank’s Business Environment 
Survey from 2000, the data by the World Bank and University of Basel (WB/UB) or from 
Business International (BI; described in Mauro [1995]). Other studies have used the Political 
Risk Service’s International Country Risk Guide (PRS/ICRG). These results must be taken 
with a grain of skepticism, as this variable does not depict corruption itself but the political 
instability  that  increases  with  corruption  but  also  with  the  public’s  intolerance  towards 
corruption. In this regard, instability is assumed to increase with the time a government has 
been in power continuously – a theoretical assumption that not all observers are willing to 
follow. Another composite index sometimes used is that by Kaufmann, Kraay and Zoido-
Lobaton [1999a]. It has the disadvantage of also including the PRS data alongside with other 
sources of less validity. However, it arrives at results very close to the TI-Index.  
 
This review includes all studies that were conducted with a sound level of academic rigor. 
With  less  sophistication,  the  media  has  been  engaged  in  suggesting  various  correlations 
between perceived levels of corruption and human development, competitiveness, judicial 
quality, credit ratings or the spread of newspapers. For an overview see Galtung [1997]. Since 
many  other  explanatory  variables  are  absent,  however,  such  correlations  risk  reporting 
spurious relationships.  
 
Whether  corruption  causes  other  variables  or  is  itself  the  consequence  of  certain 
characteristics is sometimes difficult to assess. Some types of poor government quality and 
corruption are sometimes two sides of the same coin. In this case, it can be helpful to observe 
the correlations that are reported, but one should refrain from drawing iron-clad conclusions 
with respect to causalities. 
II. The Consequences of Corruption 
1. Total Investment 
The  first  investigation  on  the  impact  of  corruption  on  investment  in  a  cross-section  of 
countries  was  undertaken  by  Mauro  [1995].  He  makes  use  of  an  older  corruption  index 
provided by Business International (BI), a private firm that sold this and related indicators of 
country risks to banks, multinational companies, and other investors. The author finds that in 
a sample of 67 countries, corruption impacts negatively on the ratio of investment to GDP. He 
claims  that  if  Bangladesh  were  to  improve  its  level  of  integrity  to  that  of  Uruguay,  its 
investment rate would increase by almost five per cent of GDP.  
 
Mauro’s finding is supported by similar investigations that use other indices of corruption and 
differing samples of countries. Knack and Keefer [1995] incorporate corruption among other 
explanatory variables into one single index of "institutional quality" and reveal a negative 
impact on the ratio of investment of GDP, however, using the data from PRS. Referring to a 
corruption  index  by  WB/UB  for  a  sample  of  41  countries,  Brunetti,  Kisunko  and  Weder 
[1998: 369] also reinforce the Mauro results. They find that corruption significantly reduces 
the ratio of investment to GDP. Mauro [1997] provides further backing for his results by 
presenting a larger sample of 94 countries and by also making use of the corruption data by 
PRS. The data by PRS was also used by Brunetti and Weder [1998] to show that corruption 
has  a  significant  negative  impact  on  the  ratio  of  investment  to  GDP  in  a  sample  of  60 countries. A negative impact of corruption on the ratio of investment to GDP in African 
countries is reported by Gymiah-Brempong [2002].  
 
Different types of corruption may lead to different outcomes. One approach to determining 
different types of corruption was expressed by the World Bank [1997: 34]: "There are two 
kinds of corruption. The first is one where you pay the regular price and you get what you 
want. The second is one where you pay what you have agreed to pay and you go home and lie 
awake every night worrying whether you will get it or if somebody is going to blackmail you 
instead." This idea was picked up in the survey by the World Bank and the University of 
Basel.  In  addition  to  an  overall  level  of  corruption,  its  predictability  and  absence  of 
opportunism was also determined. This embraced, first, whether the costs of corruption are 
known in advance and, second, whether after making the payment the service is delivered as 
promised. The resulting impact of these variables on the ratio of investment to GDP was 
investigated by the World Bank [1997]. In a sample of 39 industrial and developing countries, 
it was concluded that for a given level of corruption, countries with more predictable and less 
opportunistic corruption have higher investment rates. This approach has been extended and 
elaborated further by Campos, Lien and Pradhan [1999], who make use of the same data by 
WB/UB in a cross-section of 59 countries. While controlling for GDP per head and secondary 
school enrollment, the authors find that low predictability, high opportunism and the overall 
level of corruption reduce the ratio of investment to GDP. The authors conclude that the 
nature of corruption is also crucial to its economic effects.  
 
As corruption increases the risks associated with making investments, e.g. by lowering the 
security of property rights, economic theory predicts that corruption will have a clear negative 
impact on the ratio of investment to GDP. But if corruption affects the productivity of capital, 
an adverse impact on the ratio of investment to GDP will result, as outlined in Lambsdorff 
[2003a; 2003b]. This derives from the fact that as the productivity of capital declines, total 
output — that is GDP — drops in relation to the capital stock, meaning that the ratio of 
investment to GDP is likely to increase in reaction to corruption. As a result, studies on the 
ratio of investment to GDP might easily underestimate the total adverse impact of corruption 
on investment. 
2. Foreign Direct Investments and Capital Inflows 
Corruption may not only  be  an obstacle to domestic investors, but also render  a country 
unattractive to foreign investors. This effect should be observed by making use of data on 
foreign direct investments (FDI). In an early study, Wheeler and Mody [1992] did not find a 
significant correlation between the size of (FDI) and the host country's risk factor — which 
included corruption among other variables and was highly correlated with corruption. Another 
insignificant finding is reported by Alesina and Weder [1999], however, the authors make use 
of the variable by PRS that does not determine levels of corruption but the political instability 
due to corruption. The insignificant finding should thus not be overrated. The authors briefly 
state estimates using different data on corruption. Due to the brevity it is difficult to judge on 
the findings. The data on FDI refer to 1970-1995. But awareness towards corruption and 
levels of FDI increased considerably after 1995. Insignificance for data prior to 1995 should 
thus not be overrated. Equally inconclusive are regressions provided by Okeahalam and Bah 
[1998] and Davidson [1999], but for a small sample of countries.  
 
More  recent  studies  provide  evidence  in  favor  of  corruption  deterring  foreign  investors. 
Focusing on bilateral flows between 14 source and 45 host countries in 1990 and 1991, Wei 
[2000b] detects a significant negative impact of corruption on FDI. He finds that an increase 
in the corruption level from that of Singapore to that of Mexico is equivalent to raising the tax rate  by  over  twenty  percentage  points.
2 Aizenman  and  Spiegel  [2003]  reveal  a  negative 
impact  of  corruption,  measured  by  the  BI-data,  on  the  ratio  of  FDI  to  total  capital 
accumulation for a variety of regressions. The coefficient is robust to the inclusion of other 
any other independent variables. Lambsdorff and Cornelius [2000] show an adverse impact of 
corruption on FDI for African countries. Abed and Davoodi [2002: 523] obtain a negative 
impact of corruption on the US-Dollar per capita value of  FDI  for a  cross-section of 24 
transition countries. Doh and Teegen [2003] show that investments in the telecommunications 
industry (as reported in the World Bank’s Private Participation in Infrastructure database, PPI) 
are  adversely  affected  by  the  extent  of  corruption.  Smarzynska  and  Wei  [2000]  provide 
evidence in a similar vein for corruption to reduce firm-level assessments of FDI in Eastern 
Europe  and  the  former  Soviet  Union.  An  increase  in  corruption  from  the  (low)  level  in 
Estonia to the (high) level in Azerbaijan would reduce the probability of foreign investment 
by 15 percentage points.  
 
Henisz [2000], who uses the Conference Board Manufacturers database, provides a similar 
result. This database is a collection of data on foreign market entry for more than 1000 US 
corporations. Henisz finds that a variable on “unexpected” corruption deters market entry. 
The variable on “unexpected” corruption is the difference between “actual” corruption as 
measured  by  PRS/ICRG  and  expected  corruption  as  determined  by  data  on  the  political 
system. Given the problems with the PRS data on corruption, the results must be taken with 
some scepticism.  
 
In another publication, Wei [2000c] and Wei and Wu [2001] also hint at corruption reducing 
foreign direct investments. Interestingly enough, they argue that an impact of corruption on 
incoming bank loans cannot be obtained. Thus, corruption distorts capital inflows in corrupt 
countries towards bank loans. Similar findings are reported by Straub [2003]. This distortion 
might  reduce  economic  welfare,  because  loans  can  be  withdrawn  more  easily  in  case  of 
economic problems. This makes corrupt countries more vulnerable to currency crises. This 
effect might be amplified, because, as argued below, corruption increases bond spreads and 
thus makes loans dearer.  
 
Habib and Zurawicki [2001; 2002] also provide evidence in the line of corruption deterring 
foreign direct investments. They find the impact of corruption on FDI to be larger than that on 
local investment. They conclude that foreign investors are more sensitive to corruption than 
their local counterparts. In sum, the evidence of an impact of corruption on FDI now appears 
sufficiently well established to argue in favor of a significant negative effect.  
 
                                                 
2 A  further  contribution  by  Wei  [1997]  argues  that  in  addition  to  the  overall  level  of 
corruption it is arbitrariness that harms capital inflows. As those who pay bribes have no legal 
recourse,  contracts  obtained  through  bribery  cannot  be  enforced.  This  is  why  corruption, 
while not necessarily more expensive, is more harmful than taxes. Wei derives a measure of 
arbitrariness from the survey by WEF. While the question posed relates to the overall level of 
corruption, Wei argues that the variance in the replies represents a form of arbitrariness. This 
can be considered valid if the insecurity among respondents about the true costs of bribes is 
reflected in the variance. Arbitrariness, thus defined, significantly enters into the regressions 
on  FDI.  But  it  has  been  questioned  whether  arbitrariness  is  adequately  measured  by  this 
variable.  Particularly,  the  variance  among  respondents  could  also  reflect  heterogeneous 
conditions in a country or be related to subjective difficulties among respondents in judging 
the  right  score  on  the  questionnaire.  Arbitrariness  may  be  better  measured  by  the 
predictability of corruption, e.g. as determined by WB/UB. Lambsdorff  [2005]  provides  more  detail  by  determining  different  types  of  corruption.  It 
employs seven subcomponents of corruption for a sample of 102 countries that appear in the 
2003 Global Competitiveness Report of the WEF. The second principal component of this 
data depicts a grand, political type, embracing corruption in government policymaking and in 
judicial decisions as opposed to a petty type of corruption that can be found in public utilities 
and loan applications. It is shown that grand corruption less deters investors. This might relate 
to  smaller  organizational  effort  and  investors’  feelings  of  belonging  to  an  inner  circle  of 
insiders that can profit from hidden arrangements. The study rejects the finding by Campos, 
Lien  and  Pradhan  [1999],  cited  on  page  4.  It  claims  that  investors  are  not  deterred  by 
unpredictable corruption but by petty corruption.  
 
Another strand of research has been concerned with firm’s entry mode decision. Smarzynska 
and Wei [2000] observe an impact of corruption. Being faced with corrupt requests investors 
would prefer a joint venture to a wholly-owned foreign firm because a local partner might be 
better  acquainted  with  local  practice.  This  effect  prevails  where  a  simple  production 
technology is employed. In case of a more sophisticated technology investors would fear for 
the leakage of technological know-how to local partners. Uhlenbruck et al. [2005] investigate 
data  for  the  telecommunications  industry  (as  reported  in  the  World  Bank’s  Private 
Participation  in  Infrastructure  database,  PPI).  They  show  for  a  sample  of  220 
telecommunications development projects in 64 emerging economies that firms adapt to a 
country’s  level  of  corruption  by  avoiding  the  holding  of  equity  and  preferring  to  merely 
partner with local firms or by entering a country on a short-term basis. The authors do not find 
a significant difference between joint-ventures and wholly owned subsidiaries. Employing the 
findings by Smarzynska and Wei [2000] this might be due to the high level of technological 
sophistication  prevalent  in  the  telecommunications  industry.  In  a  spirit  similar  to  that  by 
Campos, Lien and Pradhan [1999] the authors also investigate the impact of arbitrariness, that 
is, whether the costs of bribes are arduous to predict and whether the delivery of the corrupt 
service is uncertain. They provide evidence that firms prefer joint-ventures to wholly owned 
subsidiaries  in  reaction  to  low  levels  of  predictability,  the  likely  reason  being  that  local 
partners have an edge over their international competitors in monitoring local office holders 
and exploiting trusted local relationships. Their results are robust to the inclusion of crucial 
explanatory variables. 
 
FDI represent only a minor fraction of a country's total capital inflows. In order to ascertain 
the negative welfare consequences of corruption, it is vital to prove its adverse effect on total 
capital  inflows.  In  this  context  it  is  noteworthy  that  Fons  [1999]  reports  a  significant 
correlation between the TI index and Moody's country ceiling ratings. This variable relates to 
the default risk for debt obligations issued by a national government. Fons argues that poor 
transparency  and  high  levels  of  corruption  increase  credit  risks.  In  a  more  systematic 
investigation Ciocchini, Durbin, and Ng [2003] show that countries perceived as more corrupt 
pay a higher risk premium when issuing bonds. Hall and Yago [2000] provide evidence for a 
small sample of countries that corruption increases sovereign bond spreads, making it more 
costly for countries with high levels of corruption to obtain loans. Wei and Sievers [1999] 
report a correlation between corruption and weak bank supervision. Those holding deposits or 
granting loans to banks are likely to react to allegations of corruption and withdraw their 
engagement.  As  a  consequence  of  these  findings  a  negative  impact  of  corruption  on  a 
country’s capital inflows becomes likely. 
 
The impact of corruption on these total net capital imports is shown in Lambsdorff [2003b]. 
In a cross-section of 64 countries, corruption is shown to decrease capital inflows at a high 
confidence  level,  controlling  for  various  explanatory  variables  such  as  GDP  per  head, domestic  savings  rates  and  raw  material  exports.  These  results  are  robust  to  the  use  of 
alternative indices of corruption, tests of linearity and issues of sample selection. An increase 
in Tanzania's level of integrity to that of the United Kingdom is found to increase net annual 
capital inflows by 3 percent of GDP. This coefficient falls when controlling for an index 
depicting  countries’  tradition  of  law  and  order.  This  suggests  that  investors  are  deterred 
because corruption undermines a country’s legal tradition. Such a tradition otherwise provides 
investors with the confidence that the political elite would not exploit arising opportunities 
after investors have entered a country.
3  
3. Gross Domestic Product and Inequality 
There  is  a  strong  correlation  between  GDP  per  head  and  corruption  reported  in  many 
empirical studies. But there is equal agreement that no unambiguous causality can be derived 
from  this.  While  corruption  is  likely  to  lower  GDP  per  head,  poorer  countries  lack  the 
resources to effectively fight corruption, [Husted 1999: 341-2] and [Paldam 2002]. A simple 
regression would not provide a causal link between corruption and GDP but report some 
correlation of unknown origin. Above, cultural determinants are likely to drive both, income 
and absence of corruption. Likely candidates of such cultural determinants are individualism 
and  
 
One  attempt  to  disentangle  this  simultaneous  relationship  is  provided  by  Hall  and  Jones 
[1999]. The authors regress output per worker on an indicator of social infrastructure, which 
includes a measure of corruption among other variables. There exist a variety of potential 
simultaneity problems that are addressed by the authors. One of them is related to the fact that 
the indicator of corruption is based on perceptions. If countries of equal stage of development 
differ  in  the  extent  of  corruption,  perceptions  are  undisturbed  and  may  be  particularly 
informative. But in case countries widely differ in their development, perceptions may be 
overshadowed by these differences and be less reliable. The idea advanced by the authors is 
that these problems of simultaneity can be solved by instrumental variables technique. The 
approach  by  Hall  and  Jones  [1999]  is  applied  by  Kaufmann,  Kraay  and  Zoido-Lobaton 
[1999b: 15] to the relationship between corruption and GDP per head. This appears to be a 
fruitful  path  for  future  research.  Of  particular  relevance  for  this  approach  is  whether  the 
instruments applied can be shown to adequately impact on corruption but not directly on GDP 
per head. Given that income and corruption are so highly intertwined the instruments have to 
carry  a  heavy  burden.  Not  all  readers  can  easily  be  convinced  that  a  chosen  instrument 
satisfies these requirements. Due to this, other researchers have focused their effort rather on 
variables where endogeneity issues appear less pressing.  
 
Efforts have been made to ascertain the influence of corruption on the growth of GDP — 
initially with ambiguous results. Knack and Keefer [1995] report a variable of institutional 
quality by PRS, which incorporates corruption among other factors, to exert a significant 
negative impact. Tanzi and Davoodi [2001] provide evidence for corruption (measured by the 
CPI) lowering growth for a cross-section of 97 countries. Brunetti, Kisunko and Weder [1998: 
369] as well as Li, Xu and Zou [2000] produced insignificant results. Abed and Davoodi 
[2002: 507] obtain insignificant results for a cross-section of 25 transition countries once 
including an index of the success with respect to structural reforms. Mauro [1995] found a 
slightly significant impact in a bivariate regression. But as soon as the ratio of investment to 
                                                 
3 In a more recent update of this study, rather than the legal tradition it is the extent of civil 
liberties that explains part of the impact of corruption. GDP was included as an explanatory variable, this impact disappeared.
4 Another approach is 
provided by Wedeman [1997]. Based on simple cross tabulation of growth and corruption he 
observes many corrupt countries exhibiting high growth rates. He concludes that certain kinds 
of  corruption  might  have  more  significance  for  growth  rates  than  the  overall  level  of 
corruption as such. This proposition requires further empirical research, particularly a sound 
empirical determination of types of corruption in addition to average numbers. In sum, earlier 
investigations provide mixed evidence on the relationship between corruption and growth of 
GDP.  
 
More recent investigations are more favourable to corruption lowering growth. Making use of 
data on corruption provided by PRS, Mauro [1997] produced significant results at a 95 per 
cent confidence level. Leite and Weidmann [1999: 24] and Poirson [1998: 16] also report a 
significant positive impact. An adverse impact of corruption on growth in African countries is 
reported by Gymiah-Brempong [2002]. 
 
Mo [2001] finds a significant impact of corruption on growth between 1970 and 1985 for a 
cross-section of 45 countries, controlling for initial GDP, population growth and political 
rights. He modifies the regression by successively including further explanatory variables in 
the regression. In particular these are the ratio of investment to GDP, the level of political 
stability (measured by the number of assassinations per million population per year and the 
number of revolutions) and human capital formation (measured by average schooling years). 
By adding these variables the impact of corruption on growth becomes insignificant. Mo 
traces this to the multicollinearity of corruption with these variables and argues that the results 
help to identify the channels by which corruption impacts on growth. He finds that more than 
half of corruption's impact runs via its effect on political stability, more than 20 percent via its 
impact on the ratio of investment to GDP, another 15 percent via its adverse impact on human 
capital formation and the rest is of a direct nature.  
 
In a similar spirit Pellegrini and Gerlagh [2004] trace the impact of corruption on growth of 
GDP to the ratio of investment to GDP and to a country’s openness. Méon and Sekkat [2005], 
equally detect an adverse impact of corruption on growth. This impact survives the inclusion 
of  a  variable  on  the  ratio  of  investment  to  GDP.  The  impact  becomes  even  stronger  in 
countries  with  a  low  quality  of  governance.  For  the  latter,  indicators  of  “rule  of  law“,  
“government  effectiveness“  and  “lack  of  violence”  have  been  used.  This  contradicts  the 
“grease  the  wheels”  view  of  corruption,  which  postulates  that  corruption  may  help 
compensate bad governance.  
 
The issue of whether  corruption should affect  levels of  GDP or its growth has not been 
addressed extensively in the literature. In line with Paldam [2002; Lambsdorff 2003a] argues 
that lack of corruption is a factor for the production of GDP. If this holds, growth of GDP 
should not be explained by absolute levels of corruption but by a change in these levels. In an 
unpublished study, I used responses to a 1998 WEF survey question on whether corruption 
has decreased in the past 5 years. This variable is shown to better explain growth of GDP as 
opposed to absolute levels of corruption. But since issues of endogeneity are difficult to assess 
these are not iron-clad results, but should rather be interpreted as suggestive to the issue at 
hand. Lambsdorff [2003a] uses the ratio of GDP to capital stock as a macroeconomic proxy 
for a country’s average capital productivity. The capital stock is determined by a perpetual 
inventory method. A significant negative impact of corruption on this ratio is found in a cross-
                                                 
4 Mauro thus argues that the impact of corruption on growth is largely via its impact on the 
ratio of investment to GDP. section of 69 countries, controlling for the total capital stock and testing for various other 
variables. These results are robust to the use of different indicators of corruption, the inclusion 
of further governance indicators, sample selection, and endogeneity issues. It is concluded 
that  a  6-point  improvement  in  integrity  on  the  TI  index  —  for  example  an  increase  in 
Tanzania's level of integrity to that of the United Kingdom — would increase GDP by 20 per 
cent. This coefficient falls when controlling for an index depicting countries’ bureaucratic 
quality,  suggesting  that  productivity  is  reduced  because  corruption  goes  along  with 
bureaucratic inefficiency.  
 
The benefits from corruption are likely to accrue to the well-connected at the expense of the 
poor. Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme [2002] therefore argued that corruption increases 
income inequality, as measured by the Gini coefficient. In a cross-section of 37 countries, a 
significant positive impact of corruption on inequality was found, while taking into account 
various other exogenous variables. When controlling for GDP per head, this impact remains 
significant at a 10 % level. It was concluded that a deterioration in a country's corruption 
index of 2.5 points on a scale of 0 to 10 is associated with the same increase in the Gini 
coefficient  as  a  reduction  in  average  secondary  schooling  of  2.3  years.  The  authors  test 
various instrumental variables to ascertain that the causality runs from corruption to inequality 
and not vice versa. The authors find further evidence that corruption increases inequality in 
education and land distribution. Since these variables contribute to income inequality (and had 
been controlled in the first regression) the overall impact of corruption on income inequality 
is likely to be even stronger. An impact of corruption on the inequality of income has also 
been found by Gymiah-Brempong [2002] for a sample of African countries. Also Li, Xu and 
Zou [2000] find corruption to increase inequality. They show that this effect is even stronger 
the higher the level of corruption. Unfortunately, they base their finding on the data by PRS – 
the usual caveats apply. 
 
Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme [2002] also investigate the income growth of the bottom 
20  per  cent  of  society.  Controlling  for  various  influences,  they  report  that  growth  of 
corruption exerts a significant and negative impact on this variable. However, research on 
actual trends in levels of corruption has not really started yet and the current perceptions data 
may not relate well to changes in real levels. In this perspective the results might be regarded 
with some skepticism.  
 
But whether or not the causality actually moves in a direction from corruption to inequality 
has been questioned by Husted [1999: 342-3], who argues that inequality also contributes to 
high levels of corruption. This has also been suggested by Swamy et al. [2001]. Moreover, 
both variables might be driven by cultural determinants. Acceptance of authority and low 
accessibility of people higher in hierarchy may increase inequality and corruption at the same 
time, [Husted 1999].  
 
You and Khagram [2005] provide evidence for reverse causality. They argue that the poor are 
not able to monitor and hold the rich and the powerful accountable, enabling these to misuse 
their position. The authors convincingly argue that a large fraction of inhabitants between 40 
and 59 is a good instrument for inequality. People at that age tend to obtain the largest wages, 
causing inequality. But their wages would be adjusted downwards the higher the proportion of 
these inhabitants, thus reducing inequality. The authors show that inequality, as instrumented 
by this variable, increases corruption. This effect is found to be stronger in democracies: The 
rich and the powerful can oppress the poor in autocratic regimes while in the context of 
democracy they must employ corruption when seeking to maximize their wealth. Their results 
hold controlling for a battery of control variables. Considering both well established effects, corruption increasing inequality and inequality escalating corruption, the authors conclude 
that societies can fall into vicious circles of inequality and corruption. One part of this vicious 
circle also relates to social norms and intolerance towards corruption. A country’s level of 
inequality  increases  the  likelihood  that  respondents  to  the  World  Values  Survey  regard 
cheating on taxes and accepting bribes as a justifiable types of behavior.  
4. Government Expenditure, Revenues and Services 
There  has  been  extensive  debate  on  whether  or  not  corruption  "greases  the  wheels"  by 
enabling  individuals  to  avoid  bureaucratic  delays,  or  whether  it  is  “sand  in  the  wheels”, 
mainly  by  lowering  the  security  of  property  rights  and  misallocating  resources.  A  direct 
method  for  disproving  the  notion  that  corruption  greases  the  wheels  can  be  derived  by 
investigating the impact of corruption on the quality of public institutions. One approach is 
presented  by  Kaufmann  and  Wei  [1999].  Making  use  of  data  by  WEF  and  WB/UB,  the 
authors compare respondents' assessments of the level of corruption with the time managers 
waste with bureaucrats. The resulting regressions do not relate to a cross-section of countries 
but compare firm-specific responses, resulting in thousands of observations to enter into the 
regressions.  The  authors  produced  a  highly  significant  positive  association  for  various 
specifications of the regressions. Also an indicator of the predictability of corruption from the 
survey by WB/UB has been introduced into the regressions. Higher levels of predictability 
were found to lower the time managers waste with bureaucrats. 
 
Tanzi  and  Davoodi  [1997]  examine  the  impact  of  corruption  on  the  quality  of  public 
investments. Referring to panel data on corruption from PRS for 1980–95, the authors suggest 
that corruption lowers the quality of the infrastructure as measured by the condition of paved 
roads and power outages. They support their hypothesis by reporting a high significance in 
their statistical results. However, based on own regressions for a cross-section of countries 
using the TI index for 1998 it was not possible to reproduce the significant results. This sheds 
some doubt on the robustness of the findings to different methodologies. 
 
Gupta, Davoodi and Tiongson [2001] show that countries with high levels of corruption are 
associated  with  inefficient  government  services  and  a  low  quality  of  public  health  care 
provision, as subjectively assessed by respondents. Such subjective associations may certainly 
relate to respondent’s impressions rather than  reality.  The authors therefore proceed their 
investigation with more objective proxies for the quality of government services: child and 
infant mortality as well as the percent of low-birthweight babies in total births as a proxy for 
the quality of public health care provision and student drop-out rates as a proxy for the quality 
of  public  education.  All  these  variables  react  significantly  to  levels  of  corruption.  Child 
mortality rates in countries with high levels of corruption are about one-third higher than in 
countries with low corruption; infant mortality rates are percent of low-birthweight babies are 
almost twice as high, and dropout rates are five times as high.  
 
Those who allocate resources may have better opportunities to extract illegal income from 
large investment projects than from small labor contracts. Public investments are particularly 
susceptible to this kind of misallocation. Mauro [1997] thus suggests that corruption may 
increase public investments. But the subsequent regressions provide no significant evidence. 
This  is  in  contrast  to  Esty  and  Porter  [2002]  and  Tanzi  and  Davoodi  [1997]  who  claim 
significant  evidence  for  over-investment  in  public  infrastructure.  The  latter  investigation 
refers to panel data on corruption provided by PRS for 1980–95. Given the nature of this data 
on corruption and the mixed results the evidence for this link appears to be rather poor.  
 However,  there  is  convincing  evidence  that  corruption  lowers  government  spending  on 
education. This result is analyzed in detail in Mauro [1998], the argument being that other 
expenditures offer public servants better opportunities to collect bribes. Mauro’s results hold 
for  various  specifications  but  suffer  a  little  from  the  low  explanatory  power  of  the 
regressions.
5 Gupta, Davoodi and Alonso-Terme [2002] and Esty and Porter [2002] confirm 
the finding, providing us with some more comfort.  
 
Corruption may also lead to higher spending on the military. Mauro [1998] provided rather 
insignificant  evidence  on  this  link,  contrary  to  anecdotal  evidence.  Gupta,  de  Mello  and 
Sharan [2000] investigate this relationship more intensively, basing the regressions on four 
different sources for corruption and up to 120 countries during 1985-1998. They claim that 
corruption  is  significantly  associated  with  higher  military  spending  or  higher  arms 
procurement (as a share of either GDP or total government spending). The evidence for cross-
section regressions is now significant and robust.
6  
 
A positive correlation between corruption and the size of the unofficial economy is presented 
in Johnson, Kaufmann and Zoido-Lobaton [1998: 391]. This suggests that corruption acts as 
sand in the wheels by negatively impacting on the smooth operation of the official economy. 
But whether the causality might actually be reversed, i.e. poor institutions being the cause of 
corruption, is difficult to answer. A clear consequence of the association between corruption 
and a low official economy are reduced government revenues. Tanzi and Davoodi [1997], 
Johnson,  Kaufmann  and  Zoido-Lobaton  [1998]  and  Friedman,  Johnson,  Kaufmann  and 
Zoido-Lobaton [2000] provide evidence that countries with high levels of corruption tend to 
have a lower collection of tax revenues in relation to GDP, controlling the regressions for 
income per head. This evidence is further investigated in Tanzi and Davoodi [2001] with a 
focus on the composition of tax revenues, assuming that different types of taxes respond 
differently to corruption. They claim that a 1-point increase in corruption is associated with a 
1.5 percentage point decline in total revenue relative to GDP, and a 2.7 percentage point 
decline in the ratio of taxes to GDP. Direct taxes suffer more from corruption than indirect 
taxes, suggesting that countries with high levels of corruption should rely more on indirect 
taxation – a feature that seems to be in line with current practice.  
5. International Investors and Exporters 
Indices on corruption relate to the extent as practiced within the respective countries. But in a 
global  economy  the  impact  of  corruption  reaches  across  borders.  It  affects  exporters  and 
international investors. But its effects may differ, depending on where the exporter or investor 
comes from.  
 
In a first inquiry Beck, Maher and Tschoegl [1991] found that corruption had a small negative 
but significant impact on the export competitiveness of the USA. Similar conclusions are 
reported by Hines [1995], showing that US aircraft exports after 1977 decreased in countries 
perceived to be corrupt. He also shows that US investors differed from others in preferring to 
locate their FDI in less corrupt countries after 1977. Hines relates this to the imposition of the 
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA). A related effort was undertaken by Wei [2000b] to 
find out whether Japan has a tendency to invest more in corrupt countries, the implication 
being a possibly higher Japanese propensity to pay bribes. But the author did not find any 
                                                 
5 The R
2 is as low as 0.13, indicating that either too much noise is affecting this relationship 
or too little is known about other influencing factors.  
6 Panel regressions are claimed to provide a more robust picture. However, in this case the 
authors employ the data by PRS/ICRG. differences between the investment pattern of Japan and the United States. Hines’ findings 
would also not suffice to claim a competitive disadvantage of the USA, because they could 
just as well indicate that competitive advantages in corrupt marketplaces before 1977 had 
been neutralized thereafter.  
 
In order to adequately address this question in a broad study, Lambsdorff [1998] examined 
bilateral trade data between 1992 and 1995 for the leading 18 exporting and 87 importing 
countries. While controlling for common languages, geographic distance, export composition 
and trade blocks, he concludes that Belgium, France, Italy, the Netherlands and South Korea 
have competitive advantages in countries perceived to be corrupt. Disadvantages exist for 
Australia, Sweden and Malaysia. The USA also has significantly less market share in corrupt 
countries than the first group of countries. It is concluded that these differences should be 
explained by differences in exporters' willingness to offer bribes and that the results indicate 
that  exporting  countries  must  share  part  of  the  responsibility  for  the  level  of  bribery  in 
international  trade.  An  update  of  this  study,  including  more  countries  and  trade  data,  is 
presented by Lambsdorff [2000]. While the underlying model has been modified further, the 
above mentioned results are largely reproduced. 
 
Habib  and  Zurawicki  [2001;  2002]  investigate  whether  all  investors  are  deterred  equally. 
Referring to bilateral FDI data, they find that investors coming from countries with a high 
perceived level of corruption are deterred less when entering a corrupt host country than their 
clean  competitors.  Investing  countries  that  are  more  exposed  to  corruption  in  their  home 
markets are relatively less sensitive to corruption in foreign markets. This might relate to the 
psychological distance separating the home and the host countries. Organizational or moral 
issues might be at play, because investors who obtained local experience with corruption 
might know better how to arrange corrupt deals and be less scrupulous.  
 
Alesina and Weder [2002] investigate whether corrupt governments attract or deter aid from 
OECD countries. The authors make use of a variety of different measures of corruption and 
investigate  different  samples  of  countries.  Testing  for  various  specifications  of  the 
regressions,  they  do  not  find  evidence  that  foreign  donors  discriminate  against  corrupt 
countries. Quite to the contrary, some results suggest that corrupt countries are even more apt 
to  attract  foreign  aid  from  OECD  countries.  Alesina  and  Weder  [2002]  also  investigate 
bilateral aid flows. Scandinavian countries and Australia have a significant tendency to avoid 
providing aid to corrupt countries. At the opposite extreme is the US, where a significant 
negative coefficient of the corruption variable indicates that the US tends to favor corrupt 
countries in providing aid. Unfortunately, regressions on bilateral aid flows were run using 
only the corruption variable provided by PRS. The authors did not cross-check their results by 
employing other indices, leaving a grain of skepticism regarding these controversial insights. 
 
In a similar spirit, Sandholtz and Gray [2003] show that IMF credit in the late 1990s was 
influenced  positively  by  a  country’s  level  of  corruption.  This  must  certainly  not  imply 
negligence towards corruption among the IMF, but rather point to the prevalence of payments 
crises in countries with higher levels of corruption. However, a similar influence was not 
encountered concerning World Bank loans. 
 
6. Further Variables 
Building  on  the  insight  that  corruption  increases  the  size  of  the  unofficial  economy,  Al-
Marhubi [2000] argues that the optimal level of inflation should increase with corruption, 
because the larger the size of the unofficial economy, the easier it is to raise government revenue by increasing the money stock (seignorage) rather than by distortionary taxation. He 
provides evidence for corruption increasing inflation for a cross-section of countries for a 
variety  of  specifications.  Braun  and  Di  Tella  [2000],  however,  argue  in  favor  of  reverse 
causality: They suggest that inflation tends to go along with a higher price variation. This 
increases  the  costs  for  monitoring  agents,  suggesting  that  moderate  levels  of  agent’s 
corruption will be condoned. As a result, inflation increases corruption. The authors provide 
empirical evidence, however only for the PRS data. Gerring and Thacker [2005] support this 
finding with more valid data. Overall, it appears difficult to disentangle the puzzle and to 
ascertain which direction of causality is stronger. 
 
The adverse  environmental effects of  corruption are investigated by  Welsch [2004] for a 
cross-section  of  more  than  100  countries.  The  author  argues  that  corruption  increases 
pollution. This is attributed to both a direct impact of corruption, reducing the effectiveness of 
environmental regulation, and an indirect impact, through which corruption lowers income. 
An adverse impact on emissions cannot be found. The author suggests that this may relate to 
corruption adversely impacting on the truthful reporting of this data. But, significant results 
can be found for ambient pollution of air (the urban sulphur dioxide and suspended particulate 
concentration) and water (dissolved oxygen demand and suspended solids). These results hold 
controlling  for  income  (which  is  assumed  to  have  a  non-linear,  U-shaped  impact  on 
pollution). Only the direct effect is depicted in this case.  
 
In line with these findings, Esty and Porter [2002] also provide evidence that highly corrupt 
countries tend to have lower levels of environmental quality. Smith et al. [2003] investigate 
the  impact  of  corruption  on  biodiversity,  arguing  that  corruption  limits  the  success  of 
conservation  projects.  They  show  that  countries  with  high  levels  of  corruption  tend  to 
experience decreases in the population of elephants and black rhinoceroses, a lower variety of 
species and a reduced total coverage of forest. 
Anderson  and  Tverdova  [2003]  investigate  the  impact  of  corruption  on  the  trust  in  civil 
servants and the evaluation of the political system. For this purpose they employ survey data 
from the 1996 International Social Survey Program. They find that corruption significantly 
reduces  trust  in  civil  servants,  as  reported  by  respondents.  Another  finding  relates  to 
respondents’ evaluation of the political system: “all in all, how well or badly do you think the 
system of democracy in (country) works these days?” The authors find that this assessment is 
significantly worse in countries with high levels of corruption. Interestingly, they report that 
both these impacts are significantly attenuated among supporters of the incumbent political 
authorities.  
Corruption is also seen to increase crime levels. Corruption has been shown to increase theft 
[Azfar  and  Gurgur  2004],  the  amount  of  homicides  [Azfar  2004]  and  human  trafficking 
[Azfar and Lee 2003]. All these studies claim that this result holds the use of instrumental 
variables for corruption, hence making sure that it is not only the reverse causality (crime 
increasing corruption) that accounts for the findings.  
III. The Causes of Corruption 
 
Part II investigated the consequences of corruption. But it was observed that some variables 
are so highly intertwined with corruption that they might just as well be the cause, and not 
only the result. Just to name a few, GDP per head, inequality, inflation and crime were among 
those variables. It was also shown that levels of corruption had an impact on flows of bilateral 
trade and donor assistance. This gave rise to the argument that the large exporting countries and donors in question exhibit a different propensity to pay bribes, and to accept illegitimate 
payments. This, in turn, suggests that these international actors cause corruption. But, without 
doubt, there also exist a variety of domestic causes for corruption. These will be investigated 
subsequently. 
1. Government Size and Decentralization 
Government involvement in private markets is commonly seen as a source of corruption. This 
impact appears almost tautological: the misuse of public power will increase with the extent 
of  public  power.  Such  a  tautological  correlation  would  be  obtained  if  the  Corruption 
Perceptions Index is distorted towards countries with a large government share, assessing 
more corruption in countries with a larger public sector. With large governments, bribes to 
public servants might increase relative to firms’ revenues. This might induce respondents to 
surveys on corruption to assess higher levels of corruption in countries with a larger public 
sector. It has thus been suggested that the overall size of the government budget relative to 
GDP may be positively correlated with levels of corruption. This is shown by LaPalombara 
[1994:  338]  who  used  a  sample  of  countries  in  which  Scandinavian  countries  were 
disregarded by assuming them to be an exception. The reverse finding is reported by others. 
Elliott [1997: 182-3] reports for a sample of 83 countries that the size of the government 
budget relative to GDP decreases with levels of corruption. This is supported by Adsera, Boix 
and Payne [2000]. Gerring and Thacker [2005: 245-246] report insignificant results. Thus, the 
CPI does not appear to favor small governments. It does not assess total bribes relative to 
firms’ income, but rather the likelihood of corruption and the average size of bribes to be 
encountered when dealing with the government. Thus, a merely tautological correlation is not 
obtained.  
 
There is no straightforward empirical reason to propose that governments should be reduced 
in  order  to  cut  down  on  corruption.  Elliott  [1997]  concludes  that  types  of  government 
activities may be more important than the size of their budgets. Regressing corruption on the 
government’s budget (relative to GDP) might also be affected by reverse causality: corrupt 
governments have difficulties in obtaining funding, be it through taxation or loans. See page 
11 for respective evidence. This lack of resources then forces them to operate on a rather 
small budget. Another criticism of the hypothesis by LaPalombara is provided by Husted 
[1999: 342, 350 and 354]. He argues that governments are larger in societies characterized by 
a greater acceptance of authority. As discussed below, this cultural variable may determine 
both, corruption and the size of the government budget.  
 
These considerations suggest that a more promising focus would be on particular types of 
government  expenditures  in  their  potential  to  cause  corruption.  In  this  respect  it  was 
suggested that redistributive activities as opposed to other government activities are more 
likely to cause corruption. La Porta et al. [1999: 242] show a positive correlation of the total 
government transfers and subsidies relative to GDP with corruption. However, the variable 
correlates too closely with the total government expenses, bringing about the aforementioned 
problems. In sum, no convincing evidence has been produced on government expenses as a 
cause of corruption. 
 
Some authors observe a positive correlation between corruption and a country's size, meas-
ured by total population, [Root 1999; Fisman and Gatti 2002; Treisman 1999]. These correla-
tions are robust to the inclusion of further variables. This might be taken as an indicator in 
favor of decentralization. Smaller countries might be in a better position to establish a decent 
administration  and  to  monitor  their  politicians.  Using  the  results  from  a  cross-section  of countries might be taken as an indicator that decentralizing government power could be a 
means to curb corruption.  
 
Another variable for measuring the extent of decentralization is presented by Huther and Shah 
[1998] and Fisman and Gatti [2002]. The authors interpret the share of subnational expendi-
tures in total public spending as a measure of decentralization. In a sample of 80 countries, 
this index correlates positively with various measures of good governance. Huther and Shah 
report a correlation with lack of corruption larger than 0.5.
7 The approach by Fisman and 
Gatti  [2002]  makes  use  of  the  same  variable  on  decentralization,  but  tests  whether  the 
outcome is robust to the inclusion of further variables. For a wide range of specifications they 




But Knack and Azfar [2003] provide a clear warning against these findings. They show that 
the  correlation  between  corruption  and  population  size  results  from  sample  selection 
problems. Ratings on corruption are only provided for those countries in which multinational 
investors have sufficient interest. These tend to be large nations and among the small nations 
only those which are well governed. Knack and Azfar [2003] conduct regressions for larger 




Treisman [1999] takes a more direct approach to investigating the effect of decentralization. 
Rather then regressing corruption on total population, he distinguishes between federal and 
centralized states. He reports significant evidence that federal states are more corrupt than 
centralized  ones.  But  Treisman  [1999]  argues  that  this  relationship  falls  to  insignificance 
when other variables had been included.
10 Adsera, Boix and Payne [2000] and Panizza [2001] 
                                                 
7 Huther and Shah do not include further explanatory variables. One cannot exclude that more 
developed countries are less corrupt and more decentralized at the same time. This could 
introduce an omitted variable bias. 
8 The authors also suggest that corruption may be larger when spending is decentralized while 
revenue  collection remains in the responsibility of the central  government. The argument 
appears plausible. But in the related regressions the authors proxy the level of corruption in 
local states of the USA by the number of convictions for abuse of office. However, this 
variable can easily grow with the effectiveness and effort of the judicial system rather than 
with actual incidents of corruption. 
9 The results by Knack and Azfar [2003] point to a general problem of sample selection in 
regression analysis. Their suggestion is to employ indicators which cover as many countries 
as possible. However, in regressions where corruption is used as an explanatory variable such 
indicators must include countries where little data on corruption is available. This implies that 
measures of corruption are less reliable and measured with large error. Imprecision among 
explanatory variables will bias regression results. Thus, there is no straightforward solution to 
the problem identified by Knack and Azfar. Lambsdorff [2003b] suggests to use an indicator 
of "media interest" for a country to assess the relevance of this problem. 
10 At first, part of the negative impact of a dummy variable for federal states on corruption is 
explained by a country's overall size as measured by total population. This comes about as 
federal states are commonly larger than centralized ones. Another dummy variable tested by 
Treisman indicates whether separate police forces exist both at central and subnational levels. 
Treisman argues that in this case regulatory authorities overlap, providing incentives for the 
police to "overgraze" by excessively extorting bribes. This variable significantly increases the 
level of corruption. Another side-aspect of decentralization can be that the number of veto-also fail to obtain a significant impact. On the contrary, Goldsmith [1999: 878], Kunicova 
[2002] and Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman [2005] claim significance of this variable even 
controlling for GDP per head. In a more recent publication, Gerring and Thacker [2004] are 
also supportive of a significant adverse impact of federalism on corruption. They distinguish 
between non-federal (1), semi-federal (2) and federal states (3), and mix this characteristic 
with the extent of bicameralism where no or only a weak upper house exists (0), where the 
upper house is not dominated by a lower house (1) and where non-dominance goes along with 
a different partisan distribution between the houses (2). The authors find evidence against 
federal states and in favor of unitary governments throughout a variety of regressions.  
 
In sum, simple conclusions with respect to government involvement and corruption are hard 
to  find.  Arguments  pertaining  to  decentralization  seem  to  be  dependent  on  how 
decentralization  is  precisely  quantified.  Apart  from  this,  one  cannot  exclude  that  certain 
cultural determinants drive both variables. Countries characterized by civic cooperation and 
trust  among  people  as  well  as  those  with  well  developed  subnational  units  may  be  in  a 
position to decentralize and lower corruption at the same time. 
2. Institutional Quality 
Broadmann and Recanatini [1999] show for a sample of transition economies in Europe and 
Central Asia that higher barriers to market entry lead to higher corruption. Djankov et al. 
[2002] are equally concerned with the nature of entry regulation. They determine the number 
of  procedures  required  for  starting  a  new  business  for  a  cross  section  of  71  countries, 
alongside with the necessary time and official costs. The authors find a strong correlation of 
these variables with a country’s level of corruption for a variety of specifications and control 
variables. This impact of corruption supports the argument that entry regulation often does not 
serve to correct for market failure but brings about problems of its own. 
 
Treisman [2000] finds a positive impact of "state intervention" on corruption. The former 
variable  is  measured  by  a  subjective  index  compiled  by  IMD.  But  as  other  explanatory 
variables  enter  into  the  regression,  the  relationship  is  reported  to  break  down.  Another 
correlation between corruption and a measure of policy distortion for 39 countries is presented 
by  the  World  Bank  [1997:  104  and  168].  Unfortunately,  a  precise  definition  of  policy 
distortions is absent there. Also, the robustness of the results is not tested by including further 
explanatory variables. Also Gerring and Thacker [2005] report a positive correlation between 
regulatory quality and absence of corruption. A more detailed analysis of policy distortions is 
presented by Ades and Di Tella [1999 and 1997]. The authors make use of an index that 
measures "the extent to which public procurement is open to foreign bidders" and another 
index that measures "the extent to which there is equal fiscal treatment to all enterprises". 
Both variables, and also a corruption variable are taken from the survey by IMD. Explaining 
the level of corruption, both variables enter significantly into the regressions, even controlling 
for other explanatory variables. This leads the authors to conclude that policy intervention 
causes corruption. But, the authors acknowledge that corruption may cause policy distortions 
and not vice versa, bringing about problems of simultaneity bias. Ades and Di Tella [1997] 
claim  that  their  instruments  for  policy  distortions  ascertain  the  direction  of  causality. 
                                                                                                                                                          
players who can block central governments decision increases. Corruption can emerge for 
buying off these veto-players or because corrupt regional governments will have far greater 
leverage to protect their ill-gotten gains. Treisman shows that if a regionally elected upper 
house  can  block  non-financial  legislation  by  the  central  government  this  can  increase 
corruption. But the coefficient reported for this variable is less significant. Certainly, policy distortions and corruption are quite often just two sides of the same coin. In 
this case, instruments have to carry a heavy burden. 
 
Corruption  is  a  form  of  rent-seeking  behavior  where  human  capital  is  allocated  to 
redistributive tricks  rather than productive activities. Seeking loopholes in public laws or 
searching for windfall profits due to preferential treatment by public decision makers would 
distract students from studying engineering – alternative disciplines such as law might equip 
them better for future challenges. This misallocation would go along with economic welfare 
losses. Tanzi and Davoodi [2001] determine the ratio of college enrollment in law relative to 
college enrollment in engineering in 1980 and report a significant impact on the level of 
corruption. Corrupt societies, they claim, need more lawyers.
11  
 
A simple correlation for a sample of 26 African countries is provided in Lambsdorff and 
Cornelius [2000]. They show that corruption is positively associated with the degree to which 
“government regulations are vague and lax”. These results are interesting in shifting the focus 
away from the total burden of regulation to their application. Vague and lax application of 
regulation is required for public servants in order to have sufficient bureaucratic discretion in 
their application. As long as rules are clear, they might present a burden to business, but 
would not trigger corruption. However, the findings have not yet been controlled by further 
variables, neither have they been extended to a broader sample of countries.  
 
In a similar spirit Gatti [1999] argues that a highly diversified trade tariff menu fuels bribe-
taking behavior, whereas uniform trade tariff rates limit public officials' ability to extract 
bribes from importers. She reports a positive association between the standard deviation of 
trade tariffs and the level of corruption for a small sample of 34 countries. Causality may be 
difficult to ascertain, because corrupt public servants may impose diversified tariffs so as to 
be in a better position to ask for bribes. Gatti reports that her conclusions survive endogeneity 
tests where terms of trade shocks and the Gini-coefficient for income inequality are used as 
instrument. 
3. Competition  
Concerning  the  causes  of  corruption,  studies  have  been  made  on  the  extent  to  which 
corruption can be explained by a low level of competition among private firms. Competition 
is commonly assumed to lower supplier’s prices. In public procurement, e.g., the resulting 
rents for private firms decrease. As a consequence, public servants and politicians have less to 
“sell” in exchange for bribes, reducing their motivation to start with a corrupt career. To the 
contrary,  where  competition  is  restricted  profits  increase  and  politicians  can  grasp  the 
opportunity to assign these profits – in exchange for a share.  
 
Government  restrictions  on  economic  freedom  are  likely  to  reduce  competition  and  thus 
encourage corruption. Henderson [1999] argues that corruption is negatively correlated with 
different  indicators  of  economic  freedom.  This  result  is  largely  supported  by  Goldsmith 
[1999: 878] for a sample of 66 countries, where the regression is controlled for GDP per head 
and by Paldam [2002] in multivariate regressions that include further explanatory variables 
for a sample of 77 countries. Such arguments, however, might be tautological. The Heritage 
Foundation's Economic Freedom measure, e.g., includes an assessment of corruption. This 
implies that a measure of the dependent variable is placed on the independent variable side of 
the equation, [Sandholtz and Gray 2003].  
 
                                                 
11 They also claim that this variable has a (weakly) significant impact on growth of GDP. As an alternative indicator of competition Ades and Di Tella [1995, 1997 and 1999] suggest a 
country's openness. The authors argue that openness, defined as the ratio of import to GDP, is 
negatively associated with corruption. They apply corruption data from BI (in cross-section of 
55 countries) and IMD (in cross-section of 32 countries). With both approaches the results are 
robust to the inclusion of further explanatory variables. The authors conclude that economic 
competition as measured by the degree of a country's openness reduces corruption. A similar 
finding is reported by Sung and Chu [2003] and Gerring and Thacker [2005]. 
 
However, Treisman [2000] did not find significant evidence for such an impact using the TI-
index. Apart from the mixed evidence, the ratio of import to GDP is a distorted indicator of 
competitive  pressure.  This  variable  depends  to  a  large  extent  on  the  size  of  a  country, 
measured for example by its total population. This is because large countries can compensate 
for  a  low  ratio  of  import  to  GDP  by  more  competition  within  their  own  country.  The 
usefulness  of  this  variable  has,  therefore,  been  put  in  question. Wei [2000a]  provides  an 
approach  to  disentangle  the  various  facets  by  which  openness  affects  corruption.  He 
determines a measure of "natural openness" as the extent of openness which is caused by a 
country’s  total  population,  and  its  remoteness  from  world  trading  centers.  Both  these 
measures tend to lower a country’s openness, the former because large countries tend to trade 
less with the outside world, and the latter because transport costs make foreign trade less 
attractive. These indicators are independent of a country's trade regime, and thus exogenous to 
a  regression.  He  finds  that  natural  openness  significantly  lowers  a  country's  level  of 
corruption, pointing to the helpful role of competition in reducing corruption.
 12 The residual 
openness (i.e. that part which is not explained by country size and geography) is a measure of 
a country's trade regime and its policy decision in favor of global competition. Yet, Wei does 
not find a significant impact of this variable, casting doubt on trade policy as a cause of 
corruption.  
 
Another possible measure of the extent of competition in a country can be derived from the 
number of years it has been open to trade, as assessed by Sachs and Warner [1995]. Treisman 
[2000] and Leite and Weidmann [1999] provide evidence that this variable negatively and 
significantly impacts on the level of corruption. Another measure of the lack of competition is 
the trade distance to major exporters, since transportation costs limit the competitive pressure. 
Ades and Di Tella [1999] provide evidence that corruption increases with the trade distance. 
Sandholtz and Gray [2003] report that the more international organizations a country belongs 
to, and the longer it has been a part of the major international institutions such as the United 
Nations, GATT/WTO and the IMF, the lower its level of corruption. They relate this also to 
the degree of openness. Furthermore, they report that corruption decreases with other factors 
of openness, such as International Telephone Minutes per capita and Air Freight per capita. 
They show that their results are not affected by sample selection criteria, responding to the 
criticism by Knack and Azfar [2003].  
 
Ades and Di Tella [1995] test the influence of two other indicators of competition. These are 
taken from the survey  by  IMD. A subjective index of "market dominance" measures the 
extent  to  which  dominance  by  a  limited  number  of  firms  is  detrimental  to  new  business 
development. Another index of "anti–trust laws" measures the effectiveness of these laws in 
checking non–competitive practices. The authors conclude that the less competitive a market 
                                                 
12 The finding by Knack and Azfar [2003], cited on page 15, casts doubt on Wei’s conclusion. 
They argue that the correlation between population size and corruption is merely an artifact of 
sample selection. The “natural openness” by Wei would be affected by this criticism, because 
it depends on population size.  environment, the higher will be the extent of corruption. However, the authors are aware of 
the  problems  of  causality,  and  acknowledge  that  corruption  may  provide  incentives  for 
politicians to support monopolies.  
4. Recruitment and Salaries 
The impact of merit-based recruitment on corruption in 35 developing countries has been 
investigated by Evans and Rauch [2000]. Higher values in the merit-based recruitment index 
are  associated  with  a  greater  proportion  of  higher–level  officials  in  the  core  economic 
agencies to be either in possession of a university degree, or to enter the civil service through 
a formal examination system. Controlling for income, this index is negatively associated with 
corruption.  
 
To what extent the level of public sector salaries is linked to the amount of corruption was 
examined by van Rijckeghem and Weder [2001]. They argue that low salaries force public 
servants to supplement their incomes illicitly. At the same time, high salaries are a premium 
that  is  lost  if  a  public  servant  is  caught  and  fired.  In  a  small  sample  of  31  developing 
countries,  they  find  a  significant  negative  influence  of  civil  service  wages  relative  to 
manufacturing wages on the level of corruption. Doubling the civil service wage will improve 
the corruption index by the order of 1 point of the TI index.
13 However, they employ the 
corruption data by PRS, bringing about our repeated concern. The authors also point out that 
the association may be driven by reverse causality: Corrupt countries tend to have a poor 
budgetary performance or may subscribe to the view that civil servants earn sufficient income 
from  corruption,  and  may  reduce  civil  service  pay  as  a  consequence.  Such  endogeneity 
problems diminish the prospects of fighting against corruption by increasing wages. Even 
disregarding these issues, it becomes apparent that pay increases turn out be a costly approach 
to fight corruption. 
 
Other studies provide equally poor results for the impact of wages on corruption. Swamy et al. 
[2001], [Treisman 2000] and Manow [2005] investigated the ratio of average government 
wages  to  per  capita  GDP,  controlling  for  a  variety  of  other  influences.  The  results  are 
ambiguous, and mostly insignificant, depending on the indicator for corruption employed and 
the inclusion of control variables. Manow notes that government wages (relative to GDP per 
head)  are  higher  in  poor  countries,  which  also  makes  wages  an  improbable  cause  of 
corruption. 
5. Press Freedom and the Judiciary 
By  regressing  various  indices  of  corruption  on  indicators  of  press  freedom,  Brunetti  and 
Weder [2003] show that a free press effectively deters corruption. The latter variables consist 
of  "laws  and  regulations  that  influence  media  content",  "political  influence  over  media 
content", "economic influence over media content" and "repressive actions" as compiled by 
Freedom House. These four separate indices and an aggregate index of press freedom all 
impact  negatively  on  the  level  of  corruption  in  various  specifications.  This  negative 
association between freedom of the press and corruption is also confirmed by Lederman, 
Loayza and Reis Soares [2001]. Also Sung [2002] reports this result, albeit missing to control 
for income per head. A free press appears to be a solid deterrent to corruption. However, the 
corruption index used in both studies has been that of PRS. But, Brunetti and Weder [2003] 
corroborate their findings also by using alternative indicators, providing us with some more 
                                                 
13 The authors refer to a 0.5-point improvement in a corruption index by the Political Risk 
Service.  This  index  has  about  half  the  standard  deviation  of  the  relevant  subsample  of 
countries in the TI index. confidence with respect to their findings. Corrupt authoritarian regimes may restrict press 
freedom, suggesting that part of the causality may run the other way. Nevertheless, Brunetti 
and Weder [2003] show that their findings survive the use of instruments, claiming that a 
good share of the causality runs from a free press to less corruption. Adsera, Boix and Payne 
[2000] employ data on daily average newspapers per person. These figures vary from 0.7 
daily copies per person in Hong Kong to 0 in Mauritania. They show that the amount of 
newspapers per person is negatively associated with corruption. This equally suggests that a 
successful media is a strong impediment to corrupt politics by making it difficult for elites to 
get away with corrupt behavior. 
 
An approach by the World Bank [1997: 104 and 168] focuses on the quality of the judiciary. 
While  controlling  for  other  explanatory  variables,  an  index  of  the  predictability  of  the 
judiciary from WB/UB significantly influences the level of corruption in 59 countries. A simi-
lar correlation between corruption and the independence of the judicial system is proposed in 
Ades and Di Tella [1996]. Also Sung [2002] reports this result, albeit missing to control for 
income per head.  
 
Voigt, Feld and van Aaken [2004] investigate the impact of prosecutorial independence on 
corruption. They provide data on independence with a help of a questionnaire sent to supreme 
court judges, law professors, lawyers and anti-corruption activists. The authors distinguish 
between de jure independence (e.g. life tenure, appointment and promotion by others than 
politicians, lack of executive power to substitute prosecutors working on a specific case), and 
de  facto  independence  (dependence  would  be  assumed,  for  example,  in  case  of  forced 
retirement,  frequent  changes  in  legal  foundations,  and  decreasing  income  and  budget  of 
prosecutors). They find that de facto independence decreases corruption, and relate this to the 
disciplining  effect  on  the  executive,  and  on  influential  politicians.  Interestingly,  de  jure 
independence increases corruption. This surprising finding might be related to endogeneity: 
The more the corruption among the executive, the more the willingness to pay lip service to 
prosecutorial independence. 
6. Democracy and the Political System 
The  impact  of  the  Gastil  index  (Freedom  House)  for  political  rights,  i.e.  democracy,  on 
corruption is tested by Paldam [2002]. While the correlation between these variables is large, 
in multivariate regressions this relationship breaks down as soon as GDP per head enters into 
the  equation.  Similar  results  are  reported  by  many  others,  [Sandholtz  and  Koetzle  2000; 
Goldsmith 1999; Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi 2003]. But Treisman [2000] finds a significant 
impact  for  a  selection  of  64  countries,  including  only  those  countries  which  have  been 
democracies without interruption since 1950. He argues that while the current degree of de-
mocracy is not significant, a long period of exposure to democracy lowers corruption. Gerring 
and Thacker [2004; 2005] provide significant results using the cumulative number of years a 
country has been democratic since 1900. Montinola and Jackman [2002] employ a broader 
measure of democracy, where the Gastil index enters besides an assessment of 1) freedom of 
group opposition and 2) the effectiveness of the legislative body.  They find a non-linear 
impact on corruption. As compared to autocratic regimes moderate levels of democracy do 
not  decrease  corruption.  Only  after  a  certain  threshold  is  passed  do  democratic  practices 
inhibit corruption. Manow [2005] supports this finding with the help of more topical data. 
Manow concludes that corruption in medium-democratic regimes is even (slightly) higher 
than in totally authoritarian countries. Once this threshold is passed, he provides evidence for 
democracy  reducing  corruption.  Sung  [2004]  tests  different  functional  forms  for  the 
relationship between corruption and democracy and finds that a cubic form best fits the data. 
This form reveals an ambiguous impact for countries scoring between 7 and 2 in the Freedom House index. Only the good score of 1 brings about decreased corruption. However, he fails 
to control for income per head, making it difficult to judge on the robustness of the findings. 
Adsera, Boix and Payne [2000] obtain significant results for electoral participation. Countries 
with higher participation elicit lower levels of corruption. This also provides a more intricate 
picture of democracy. 
 
Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi [2003] test the impact of electoral rules on corruption in a cross 
section of more than 80 democracies. They argue that smaller voting districts, characterized 
by few representatives being elected in each district, increase corruption, because they impede 
the entry of new candidates. Small voting districts require increased effort for a candidate or a 
political  party  to  adapt  to  local  requirements  and  needs,  lowering  competition  among 
candidates  and  their  accountability  towards  their  constituency.  In  contrast,  larger  districts 
imply  lower  barriers  to  entry  for  new  parties,  or  new  candidates,  and  the  increased 
competition helps reduce corruption. They report a significant negative impact of the size of 
voting  districts  on  corruption.  However,  this  impact  is  significant  only  at  a  10  percent 
significance level, and not robust throughout different specifications. Also Panizza [2001] 
reports less significant findings. Another more significant finding by Persson et al. relates to 
party lists. The authors find that corruption is higher in countries whose parliamentarians are 
elected from party lists, rather than as individual candidates. The likely reason is that such 
election systems go along with less individual accountability. The authors suggest that the 
good score of Chile might to a considerable degree be attributed to its electoral rules, which 
avoids small districts and limits party lists. 
 
These  findings  are  challenged  by  Manow  [2005]  who  argues  that  political  scientists 
commonly  propose  the  opposite  association.  A  political  party’s  time  horizon  is  typically 
longer than that of individual candidates, suggesting that the malfeasance of a single party 
member brings about severe damage to the reputation of the political party. This explains their 
willingness  to  discipline  their  members.  The  favorable  role  often  played  by  established 
political  parties  and  their  capacity  in  containing  corruption,  he  argues,  deserve  to  be 
reconsidered. Manow shows that the negative impact of party lists by Persson et al. breaks 
down  (with  respect  to  significance  and  magnitude)  when  restricting  the  sample  to  more 
mature democracies or  countries with a high level of political  freedom. He  assumes that 
effects other than those identified by Persson et al. might be at play.  
 
Chang and Golden [2004] criticize the simplified variable on party list voting in the approach 
by Persson et al.. They argue that closed-list voting, where voters only cast votes for parties, 
should  be  distinguished  from  open-list  voting,  where  voters  both  select  a  party  and  rank 
candidates given the party’s selection of candidates. The two types fare differently, depending 
on the size of voting district. Chang and Golden [2004] find that in the case of large voting 
districts closed-lists contain corruption while in small voting districts candidates should come 
from open lists so as to limit corruption. They argue that politician’s need to amass (possibly 
illegal) resources to out-campaign their opponents in open-list voting. This effect becomes 
stronger in large voting districts, suggesting that closed lists turn out to be superior.  
 
Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi [2003] observe a positive correlation between the size of the 
voting district and the prevalence of voting from party lists. A voting system tends to be either 
characterized by plurality rule, where seats are awarded to the individual candidates receiving 
the highest vote shares in small voting districts, or by proportional representation systems 
where  political  parties  compete  in  larger  voting  districts.  These  large  voting  districts  are 
preferable with respect to lowering corruption, but the prevalence of candidates coming from 
party  lists  would  increase  corruption.  The  disadvantage,  they  find,  is  stronger  so  that proportional  election  increases  corruption.  The  disadvantage  of  larger  voting  districts  in 
plurality rule is more than outbalanced by an advantage from avoiding party lists.  
 
This finding is empirically supported by Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman [2005]. They also 
employ a related index of “particularism”. This variable is more complex than the dummy 
variable  that  describes  electoral  systems  as  either  plurality  voting,  or  proportional 
representation.  It  embraces  party  influence  with  variables  as  to  which  candidate  uses  the 
party’s label, whether votes relate to candidates or pools of candidates, and whether voters 
can voice preferences for parties or candidates. Although skeptical of this data, Kunicova and 
Rose-Ackerman  [2005]  confirm  that  corruption  increases  when  elections  are  more  party-
centered for a sample of 93 democracies (countries scoring better than 5.5 in the freedom 
house index). This result corroborates the unfavorable findings on proportional representation.  
 
Manow [2005], however, claims significance for the opposite finding once restricting the 
sample  to  47  countries  that  score  at  most  3  in  the  freedom  house  index.  He  claims  that 
political parties’ influence in elections reduces corruption. An explanation to these puzzling 
findings might be found in Panizza [2001: 326, 336 and 338]. He finds no statistical linear 
impact of “particularism” in regressions for 101 countries. However, he obtains a non-linear 
impact: Countries with moderate party influence, and some limited power among individual 
candidates  fare  best,  Panizza  [2001:  336  and  338].  Particularly  in  the  light  of  this  non-
linearity,  the  selected  sample  of  countries  can  seriously  affect  the  results.  For  example, 
disregarding African, Latin American and Eastern European countries where elections are 
rather party-centered and corruption is rife, would provide results that are rather favorable to 
political parties, in line with Manow’s findings. Assuming that, for example, Germans may 
attribute more validity to comparisons with other mature democracies, there is no simple right 
or wrong with respect to choosing the sample – and no iron-clad advice to be obtained from 
the existing studies on particularism. 
 
Gerring  and  Thacker  [2004]  investigate  the  capacity  of  parliamentarism  in  containing 
corruption as opposed to presidential systems, where policymaking power is divided between 
the legislature and the president. They find evidence for parliamentary systems, determined as 
a  dummy  variable,  being  associated  with  less  corruption.  A  similar  result  is  reported  by 
Lederman, Loayza and Reis Soares [2001] and Panizza [2001]. Kunicova [2005] reports the 
same finding for a sample of more than 100 countries and controlling for a battery of further 
variables. She extends her analysis by introducing a dummy variable for presidents with term 
limits. She report that presidentialism increases corruption significantly where when it goes 
along with term limits. She argues that this is likely to result when incumbents have little to 
lose at the end of their term. In addition, she shows that corruption increases where presidents 
are more powerful, that is, where their range of power expands across both legislative and 
non-legislative functions. For a sample of 43 presidential countries she shows that corruption 
increases with this indicator of power. 
 
Kunicova  and  Rose-Ackerman  [2005]  jointly  investigate  parliamentarism  versus 
presidentialism and plurality voting versus proportional representation. They confirm both 
previous findings: the systems most prone to corruption are presidential systems with closed-
list proportional representation. Their results on closed-list versus open-list voting are less 
significant – the more complex interaction found by Chang and Golden [2004] might be at 
play.  
 
Adsera, Boix and Payne [2000] obtain an unexpected positive impact for presidentialism on 
the  absence  of  corruption.  This  might  result  from  their  different  quantification  of presidentialism. This variable is no longer determined as a dummy variable, but takes on the 
values of 0 if the president is elected directly, 1 if the president is elected by the assembly, but 
has substantial powers, and 2 if the system is purely parliamentarian. The different finding 
might also result from their inclusion of a variable on political instability, which increases in 
corruption.
14 More empirical research is needed on this front. The quality of political parties, 
along the theoretical reasoning provided by Shugart [1999], may be worthwhile considering 
here. He argues that presidentialism might be a second best alternative in countries where 
political parties are not devoted to broad national interests. Avenues of future research may 
focus on introducing Shugart’s hypothesis into the existing research.  
 
In sum, democracy reduces corruption, but not the lukewarm type, not the type with little 
electoral  participation  and  not  immediately  after  its  implementation.  Before  transforming 
authoritarian systems into halfhearted democracies it is worthwhile considering whether such 
systems have established their peculiar methods of honoring integrity and how these might be 
endangered during transition. Thinking about an ideal type of democracy, there is evidence 
that  presidential  systems  fare  worse  with  respect  to  corruption  as  compared  to 
parliamentarism. But it remains to be seen whether presidentialism might be a second best 
option  where  political  parties  are  of  poor  quality.  Finally,  but  less  strong  in  magnitude, 
electoral systems of proportional representation are associated with higher corruption than 
plurality rule with single-member districts. Westminster democracy would be the model best 
capable  in  reducing  corruption.  This  result  survives  the  inclusion  of  dummy  variables  of 
British colonialism and British legal origin. It really seems to be the electoral system that is at 
play. However, Kunicova and Rose-Ackerman [2005] point out that these effects of electoral 
rules are rather small as compared to that of other variables. Also, some influence of political 
parties has been found to be helpful in containing corruption. Considering that changing the 
electoral  system  can  be  a  costly  thing,  even  going  along  with  transitional  insecurity  and 
corruption, the disadvantage of proportional representation might be too small to suggest an 
abandonment  of  this  voting  system.  Proportional  representation  might  be  acceptable,  in 
particular  because  it  tends  to  go  along  with  more  favorable  large  voting  districts.  Once 
accepting large voting districts there is also no reason to reject closed-list voting.  
7. Cultural Determinants 
Some societies are characterized by a high level of trust among its people, while in others 
people tend to have misgivings about each other.  Investigating the consequences of such 
forms of "social capital" has been made possible with data from the World Values Survey, 
which surveys 1000 randomly selected people since the 1980s in an increasing number of 
countries. One question has been: "Generally speaking, would you say that most people can 
be trusted or that you can't be too careful in dealing with people?" La Porta et al. [1997: 336] 
argue  that  trust  can  be  helpful  in  fighting  corruption,  since  it  helps  bureaucrats  to  better 
cooperate with each other and with private citizens. In a sample of 33 countries, the authors 
show that trust has a significant negative impact on corruption, while controlling for GDP per 
head.  This  finding  is  corroborated  by  Adsera,  Boix  and  Payne  [2000].  Uslaner  [2004] 
supports the negative association between trust and corruption. Concerned with the causality, 
he claims that trust lowers corruption while the opposite causality is less robust. Björnskov 
and Paldam [2004] undertake a first attempt to construct time series with the Transparency 
                                                 
14 A possible interpretation could be that parliamentarism reduces corruption because it goes 
along  with  political  stability.  In  this  case,  once  controlling  directly  political  stability  the 
positive affect of parliamentarism is no longer obtained. International data on corruption. Seeking explanatory variables, they find that trust is about 
the only one with significant impact.
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Also the role of religion in contributing to the level of corruption was examined by La Porta et 
al. [1997: 337]. The authors consider the Catholic, Eastern Orthodox and the Muslim religion 
to be particularly hierarchical — and that such hierarchical forms of religion are detrimental 
to civic engagement, a factor which should help reduce corruption. For the same sample of 33 
countries mentioned above, the authors report a positive association between the percentage 
of  population  belonging  to  a  hierarchical  religion  and  corruption,  controlling  for  other 
influences. For a larger section of 114 countries this relationship is reproduced by La Porta et 
al. [1999: 251-2]. But, here the relationship becomes rather weak as soon as GDP per head is 
included.  A  strong  association  between  religion  and  corruption  is  obtained  by  Treisman 
[2000]. He relates corruption to the percentage of Protestants in the total population in a 
sample of up to 64 countries and obtains a highly significant negative impact of this index on 
corruption, controlling for other variables such as GDP per head. This is corroborated by 
Lipset and Lenz [2000] and Gerring and Thacker [2005: 245-246]. In contrast to these studies, 
however, Sandholtz and Gray [2003] claim that Protestantism loses significance both in larger 
samples, and when one controls for a variety of indicators on openness. A more in-depth 
analysis of the impact of various religions is provided by Paldam [2001]. He identifies 11 
different  groups  of  religions  and  tests  their  impact  on  corruption,  controlling  for  other 
variables. While in countries with a large fraction of Reform Christianity and tribal religions 
corruption is lower, higher levels of corruption can be found in countries with a large in-
fluence of Pre-Reform Christianity, Islam, Buddhism and Hinduism. However, the impact is 
only significant for Reform Christians (Protestants and Anglicans).  
 
In line with the argument by La Porta et al., the idea that hierarchies contribute to corruption 
has been supported by  Husted [1999], who uses a totally different dataset. Based on the 
surveys by Hofstede [1997], he employs the resulting data on cultural values. One variable 
defined  there  is  called  "power  distance"  which  measures  "the  extent  to  which  the  less 
powerful members of institutions and organizations within a country expect and accept that 
power is distributed unequally", [Husted 1999: 343]. This variable is shown to have a positive 
impact on the level of corruption in a sample of 44 countries in various regressions, while 
controlling  for  other  explanatory  variables.  Concomitant  with  this  indicator,  two  further 
cultural  variables  positively  and  significantly  impact  on  the  level  of  corruption:  first,  the 
extent to which the quest for material success dominates over a concern for the quality of 
life
16 and, second, the extent to which members of a culture feel threatened by uncertainty or 
unknown situations. The latter variable must clearly be distinguished from risk avoidance, 
which  might  be  expected  to  lower  corruption.  The  idea  is  that  corruption  may  give  its 
beneficiaries the hope of reducing the level of uncertainty they face.  
 
Tracing the level of corruption to cultural determinants should not suggest that corruption is 
by and large inevitable. Culture can explain only a certain fraction of the level of corruption, 
and  there  remains  sufficient  room  for  improvements  of  a  country's  integrity.  But  a  clear 
                                                 
15 As pointed out repeatedly, the time series value of the Transparency International data is 
distorted because of annual changes in the composition of sources. Björnskov and Paldam 
[2004] refer only to ordinal changes in the data over time, i.e. whether a country improves in 
rank relative to others. Due to this approach, it might be possible that one-shoot changes that 
are  of  purely  methodological  nature  play  a  minor  role  as  compared  to  actual  trend 
information.  
16 This variable is called masculinity-femininity. I avoid this misleading term. conclusion  drawn  by  Husted  [1999]  is  that  effective  measures  to  fight  corruption  are 
dependent on culture. Countries with a large power distance, or a strong desire for material 
wealth will require different treatment than others. 
 
In contrast to the positive impact of trust on the absence of corruption, some types of trust can 
also be a facilitator for corrupt transactions. Since corrupt deals cannot be legally enforced, it 
requires trust among the partners that their favors will be  reciprocated. This resembles a 
strategic type of trust that clearly differs from “generalized trust” as assessed by the World 
Values  Survey.  Lambsdorff  and  Cornelius  [2000]  provide  a  correlation  indicating  that 
countries, where bribers are confident that favors will be reciprocated, also exhibit higher 
levels  of  corruption.  A  more  detailed  investigation  of  this  relationship  is  provided  in 
Lambsdorff [2002]. Throughout various specifications and different indices of corruption, it is 
shown  that  opportunism  among  corrupt  partners,  although  potentially  troublesome  to 
investors, reduces a country's level of corruption. Instrumental variable technique ascertains 
the hypothesized causality. It is concluded that the adverse effects of corruption cannot be 
avoided by divesting it of its unpredictability.
17 The term "trust", on the other hand, requires a 
precise definition before sound conclusions vis-à-vis its impact on levels of corruption can be 
derived. 
 
Sandholtz and Taagepera [2005] determine two cultural dimensions from the World Values 
Survey  conducted between 1995 and 2001. A first dimension measures traditional versus 
secular-rational authority attitudes. This contrasts traditional religious values and secularism. 
A second dimension relates to survival versus self-expression. This measures the extent to 
which people are focused on personal and economic security, or on personal self-expression 
and quality of life. African and Muslim countries have traditional attitudes, and a high extent 
of  “survival”  due  to  their  low  income.  Protestant  countries  are  oriented  towards  self-
expression and have secular attitudes. Former communist countries have a secular tradition, 
but again a high level of “survival”due to their low income. They give up on God while still 
feeling insecure and unhappy. Respondents from Latin America, USA, Ireland, Canada and 
Australia  are  committed  to  self-expression,  but  have  some  traditional  attitudes  towards 
authority. These countries combine belief in god with the feeling of security and happiness. 
The authors show that a strong “survival” orientation contributes twice as much as a strong 
“traditional” orientation to higher levels of corruption. The authors, unfortunately, are not 
very concise in explaining how these dimensions have been determined. They also do not 
control their regression for some standard variables, such as GDP per head. In light of this, the 
significant result for tradition appears more interesting than the one for survival, which is 
likely  to  fare  less  significant  once  controlling  for  income  per  head.  The  higher  level  of 
corruption in post-communist countries is also reported by Gerring and Thacker [2005: 245-
246] who show that a socialist legal tradition increases corruption.  
 
Lipset  and  Lenz  [2000:  120]  create  a  scale  to  measure  “familism”  and  then  test  the 
relationship between familism and corruption. Their data on familism is the percentage of 
respondents from the World Values Survey agreeing that regardless of the qualities and faults 
of one’s parents, a person must always love and respect them. A second item measures the 
percentage  of  people  who  think  that  divorce  is  unjustifiable.  In  regression  analysis,  the 
measures of familism is strongly related to corruption, even when controlling for per capita 
income.  
                                                 
17 This conclusion is in contrast to Wei [1997] and Campos, Lien and Pradhan [1999] and 
other researchers who consider the lack of predictability of corrupt deals to add to its adverse 
welfare effects. 8. Further Variables 
The impact of gender on corruption has been investigated recently by Swamy et al. [2001] 
Dollar et al. [2001]. The authors determine the percentage of women in the labor force and in 
parliament. Both indicators negatively impact on the level of corruption in a cross-section of 
up  to  66  countries.  The  influence  is  large  in  magnitude,  highly  significant  and  robust 
throughout a large variety of regressions, controlling for various variables. These findings are 
in line with some micro-evidence reported by Swamy et al., and suggest that policies designed 
to increase the role of women may help lower the level of corruption. Similar results are 
reported by Sung and Chu [2003].  
 
On the other hand, there are also reasons for the presence of reverse causality. Low levels of 
corruption may impose restrictions on male dominated networks, provide women with legal 
recourse, and improved access to higher positions. Furthermore, both female participation and 
corruption might be driven by other factors. This is the argument advanced by Sung [2003]. 
He shows that the impact of gender on corruption decreases considerably once controlling for 
further variables such as rule of law, press freedom and democracy. His results are robust to 
the inclusion of standard control variables. He concludes that it is largely these institutions 
that  simultaneously  help  women  and  integrity,  rather  than  female  participation  lowering 
corruption. 
 
There  are  still  no  full-fledged  studies  about  the  impact  of  colonialism  on  the  level  of 
corruption. But variables of colonial heritage sometimes enter as control variables in studies 
investigating the causes of corruption. This is the case in Swamy et al. [2001] and Treisman 
[2000]. According to Treisman, former British colonies exhibit lower levels of corruption 
than other countries, controlling for the level of income per head and various other variables, 
such as the existence of a common law legal system. This result is reproduced by Swamy et 
al.  [2001].
18 Both  studies  found  that  colonies  of  other  countries  do  not  exhibit  the  same 
reduction in the level of corruption.  
 
It is surprising that colonialism does not increase the level of corruption, as suggested by 
anecdotal evidence. But as outlined above, these studies did not primarily intend to investigate 
the impact of colonialism on corruption. To arrive at sound conclusions, further analysis is 
required, which should go beyond the use of dummy variables and take into consideration 
certain characteristics of colonial rule, as was done by Treisman [2000] for British colonies. 
 
Ades and Di Tella [1999] and Leite and Weidemann [1999] argue that abundance of natural 
resources creates opportunities for rent-seeking behavior, and gives rise to corruption. Both 
studies measure the first variable as a country’s exports of fuels and minerals as a share of 
GNP. Throughout various specifications this variable is found to significantly increase the 
level of corruption. These results are robust to the inclusion of various explanatory variables, 
different samples of countries and the use of different indicators of corruption. A similar 
finding is reported by Kunicova [2002]. Montinola and Jackman [2002] argue similarly, but 
employ a dummy variable for OPEC member states instead, which relates to abundance of oil. 
This variable also significantly increases a country’s level of corruption. Another study by 
Gylfason  [2001]  argues  that  the  abundance  of  natural  resources  can  be  measured  by  the 
proportion  of  the  labor  force  employed  in  primary  production.  He  reports  a  positive 
association of this proxy with corruption, controlling for income per head.  
                                                 
18 Lederman,  Loayza  and  Reis  Soares  [2001],  however,  disagree.  In  their  regressions  the 
British legal tradition did not lower corruption. This may relate to their use of the PRS data on 
corruption.  
Sandholtz  and  Gray  [2003]  show  that  countries  surrounded  by  corrupt  neighbors  exhibit 
higher  levels  of  corruption.  Neighbors  may  share  similar  cultural  affinities  and  norms; 
attitudes towards corruption may spill over from one country to another due to strong regional 
exchange. Gerring and Thacker [2005] observe that corruption decreases with a country’s 
distance from the equator.  
8. Conclusions on Consequences  
In a recent wave of empirical studies the causes and consequences of corruption have been 
investigated at large. It can be concluded that corruption clearly goes along with a low GDP, 
inequality of income, inflation, increased crime, policy distortions and lack of competition. 
The direction of  causality for these indicators,  however, is controversial. Corruption may 
cause these variables but is at the same time likely to be their consequence as well. This 
suggests that countries can be trapped in a vicious circle where corruption lowers income, 
increases inequality, inflation, crime, policy distortions and helps monopolies at the expense 
of competition. These developments in turn escalate corruption. There  is a heavy burden 
placed on instrumental variable technique in trying to disentangle these mutual dependencies. 
 
There is strong evidence that corruption lowers a country's attractiveness to international and 
domestic investors. This reduces capital accumulation and lowers capital inflows. Also the 
productivity  of  capital  suffers  from  corruption.  There  is  equally  strong  evidence  that 
corruption  distorts  government  expenditure  and  reduces  the  quality  of  a  wide  variety  of 
government services, such as public investment, health care, tax revenue and environmental 
control. This corroborates that large welfare losses result from corruption.  
 
With respect to the causes of corruption, not all empirical results were consistent with our 
expectations. For example, the disciplining and motivating effect of higher official wages was 
found to be rather limited. Also the impact of colonialism on corruption was ambiguous. Press 
freedom and the (de facto) independence of the judiciary and prosecutors appeared to be 
important  elements  in  reducing  corruption.  Increased  corruption  also  resulted  from 
complicated regulation of market entry and tariffs. Corruption was found to increase with the 
abundance of natural resources and with the distance to the major trading centers. However, 
these two latter results provide no direction for reform. The same is largely true of cultural 
dimensions.  In  particular,  a  mentality  of  accepting  hierarchies  was  found  to  increase 
corruption.  
 
Democracy obtained the expected positive impact on absence of corruption. However, this 
impact was more complex. Only countries with high levels of democracy, or electoral systems 
with high rates of participation, are able to reduce corruption. Medium levels of democracy 
can even increase corruption. The effect of democracy is also not immediate but takes decades 
rather than years. Thus, democracy reduces corruption in the long run, but not the lukewarm 
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